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When this thesis was first conceived it was as an opportunity to 
examine the nature of one segment of Japan's relations with Southeast Asia. 
The issue of economic assistance is an especially timely one as Japan has 
just become the largest source of overall flows from the developed nations 
to those less fortunate.
Southeast Asian nations have historically been the major recipients of 
Japanese assistance programs. The reasons for this are many, including the 
wealth of natural resources in many of these countries and a sense of 
cultural affinity between the Japanese and their fellow Asians. The aid 
programs were initially focused in Southeast Asia because of Japan's legal 
obligation to provide reparation from World War II.
Burma is not a typical recipient of Japanese assistance. Although the 
country has substantial natural resources, foreign nations have not had a 
consistent avenue of accessing them in the last forty years. Burma fits the 
profile of other Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members' aid 
recipients even less than it fits Japan's profile. Yet for all its apparent 
insignificance Burma has received not inconsid arable amounts of aid since 
World War II, with Japan as the number one donor. In fact, Burma has 
consistently been one of the top ten recipients of Japanese assistance. Thus 
this relationship is not insignificant. Indeed, I believe that it serves as a 
good illustration of the goals and motives of the Japanese assistance 
program.
2The paper begins with an historical analysis of the development of the 
Japanese aid program. This is followed by a look at the question of the 
motivations behind the Western world's support for foreign aid programs. 
After a discussion of the various motivations, it examines the peculiarities 
of the Japanese assistance program. The paper than shifts the focus to 
Burma, with a recounting of the significant economic and political 
developments since World War II. I have then attempted to pull all of this 
information together to understand what each country has expected to gain 
from their interactions.
The conclusion shows how well the Japanese- Burmese foreign 
assistance relationship exemplifies the uniqueness of the Japanese aid 
system in comparison to those of its fellow Development Assistance 
Committee members.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE JAPANESE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
As the U.S. occupation came to a close in the 1950s, Japanese leaders 
had to determine the direction their country would take. Many of the 
concerns of postwar Japan were the same as thuse before the war; security, 
economic development, and ascendancy in the international community. 
(Hasegawa, pp. 10-11) Under the peace treaties signed in the 1950s Japan
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agreed to pay reparations to four countries; Burma, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, and South Vietnam. To other countries who had suffered at the 
hands of the Japanese during the war but who did not receive reparations per 
se, reparation-like payments were planned. Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand received those monies which 
constituted the beginnings of Japanese foreign aid. (Hasegawa, p.146) 
Certainly the Japanese did not volunteer to offer reparation payments. This 
was one to the conditions Japan had to fulfill before being able to reenter 
the international community on good terms. Yet the structuring of the 
reparations program allowed the Japanese to use the program to their own 
advantage as well. When the reparatlons/foreign aid program began in the 
early 1950s Japan had in mind five initial objectives to turn the program 
into a positive experience for Japan. These initial objectives were; 1) to 
spur Japanese reconstruction and economic growth, 2) to begin 
reestablishing diplomatic relations with neighboring countries, 3) to 
maintain political,economic, and social systems which would help to 
stabilize the policies in the region, thus benefiting Japan, 4) to raise per 
capita income in Japan, and 5) to assert leadership both regionally and 
globally. (Hasegawa, p. 11)
Due to the lack of natural resources which makes the country so 
dependent on trade, Japan had to develop specific plans in the hope of 
obtaining various economic goals. The reparations program, which lasted 
approximately ten years, played a key role in three of these goals.
4(Hasegawa, p. 11) Of course the primary goal was the recovery of the 
economy from the damage of the war. Secondary to that were the promotion 
of Japanese exports, and the development of heavy industry. (Hasegawa, p. 
3P) Alt of the reparations payments were tied to Japanese goods and 
services In order to have the program play a role in reaching these goals. 
Though payments were tied the goods given as reparations did not account 
for a significant percentage of Japan's exports at that time. This was due to 
the stipulation that the goods given as reparations could not be products the 
recipient would otherwise have purchased directly from Japan. (Hasegawa, 
pp. 49-50)
In the 1950s the responsibilities of aid participation began to be 
divided among the ministries. Overall the attitude taken was one of 
promoting economic cooperation between Japan and the LDCs. This was led 
by the Economic Planning Agency (EPA) which was concentrating its efforts 
on developing the overseas markets necessary for Japan to be successful at 
building up heavy industry. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI) thought in much the same way. Exports and trade are MITI’s realm and 
the ministry was determined to use "economic cooperation" as one way of 
expanding Japanese markets. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) 
acknowledged the importance of economic cooperation; however, they were 
equally concerned with offering assistance for national security reasons. 
Southeast Asia was the obvious arena for economic cooperation, which the 
MFA defined as reparations, technical assistance and cooperation, private
5cooperation and government assistance to private business. (Rix, pp. 23-24) 
The Ministry of Finance's (MOF) participation at this stage of the program 
was centered on its control of both the budget process and Japan's 
international monetary policy. (Rix, p. 25)
Pressure for Japan to become involved in developing an nid program 
was the strongest from the United States. The U.S. saw the world through 
the framework of cold war policy and development assistance was part of 
that policy, alongside military spending. The U.S. argued that since Japan 
was not spending much on defense they should be able to help in the 
strategic effort through aid programs. (White, pp. 215-6)
Japan's sole participation in international consortia on aid at this early 
stage was through the Colombo Plan, which was set up by the British 
Commonwealth as a consultative body on aid policy in 1950. (Hasegawa, 
p.97) Japan joined the Colombo Plan in 1954, and in 1955 sent out the first 
Japanese technical advisors under its auspices. These advisors had only 
limited success due to their limited knowledge of the cultures and 
languages of the countries where they were sent. (Hasegawa, pp. 123-5)
The Export-Import Bank, or Exim Bank, was set up by the Japanese 
government in this first phase of reparations-as-aid. Its original duties 
included financing exports and imports of heavy machinery, and financing 
overseas Investment. (Hasegawa, pp. 137-8) Exim Bank financed the first 
yen loans to foreign governments in 1958, thus ushering in a new era in 
Japanese aid. (White, p. 215)
6The basic motivation for such expansion into a broader aid program was 
to regain international respectability. Japan very badly wanted to rebuild 
the important diplomatic and economic relationships which w~re destroyed 
in World War II. (White, p. 220) Prior to being allowed to join the United 
Nations in 1956, Japan pursued this goal through participation in various 
international organizations such as the Colombo Plan, the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, and the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. (Hasegawa, pp. 96-8) The 
goal of reintegration into the international community was truly achieved 
when Japan was accepted as a founding member of the DAC in 1961.
It was evident that the primary goal of what Japan still referred to as 
economic cooperation, instead of economic assistance, was the benefit of 
Japan. This was shown to be the case when the country sought reassurance 
at the time of joining the DAC that they would not be bound by DAC 
recommendations. In this case, membership in the DAC was the road to full 
membership in the OECD. (Rix, pp. 28-9) In 1960 the government published 
the Income Doubling Plan which outlined the effort to double national 
income in the next decade. This became the government's number one 
economic priority and accordingly all economic strategies were tied to the 
Plan. Even with the strong desire to reenter the international community 
through the DAC, Japan was not willing to accept the risk that it could lose 
control over any segment of its economic strategy. Therefore at this time, 
all of Japan's economic strategies had to be tied to the Income Doubling Plan
7of the 1960s. It also became evident at this point that Japan preferred to 
evaluate its aid programs in terms of quantitative rather than qualitative 
improvements; this attitude has continued to the present day. (Rix, pp. 27-8)
During the 1960s, each of the ministries developed firmer ideas over 
the appropriate direction the aid program should take. Each became more 
determined to shape the program in such a way as to correspond with the 
ministry's internal concerns and views. (Rix, pp. 33-4) Nominally the three 
big ministries MFA, MITI, and MOF cooperated with the EPA in approving 
government loans, but often the powerful ministries stifled the less 
important EPA. (Rix, p.36)
MFA's responsibilities at this time included technical assistance, 
which was administered through the Overseas Technical Cooperation Agency 
(OTCA). (Rix, p. 36) OTCA was established in 1962 to deal with recipient 
countries directly. A country would approach OTCA officials through the 
Japanese embassy in their country. One writer sees the emphasis placed on 
government to government relations as a fault of OTCA because it limited 
the accessibility of the technical programs to those individuals with close 
ties to their government. (Hasegawa, pp. 141-2) Strengths of this 
framework include the added legitimacy a recipient government would 
receive as the broker of such programs. Another area of MFA control was 
the Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers, who were administered under 
the OTCA. MFA also shared control of Japan's participation in multilateral 
aid groups with MOF. (Rix, p. 36)
8MFA had developed a broader, more sophisticated v>ew of the purpose of 
aid by the early 1960s, which was based on three tenets. First, they 
believed in the natural interdependence of Japan and Southeast Asia, which 
explains why the vast majority of bilateral aid went to that region. Second 
was a recognition of the U.S.'s Cold War politics in the support of certain 
governments who were seen as crucial for continuing stability. And finally, 
the MFA recognized that Japan had a moral responsibility to provide aid as 
Asia's largest economy. (Rix, pp. 26-7)
MITI published a report in 1961 that recognized the importance of aid 
a s " the mission of the world's industrial nations"; however, they refuted 
cold war objectives as a legitimate rationale for aid giving, continuing to 
consider Japan's economy and its growth as the primary objectives of the 
aid program.(Rix, pp. 26-7) Even though MITI had finally begun to recognize 
the importance of the LDCs as a political force, they refused to support 
further expansion of the aid program if they thought it might take resources 
away from the domestic economy. (Rix, pp. 36-7)
MOF's attitude was similar to MITI’s, and MOF's concerns had greater 
effect due to their control of the budget. They refused to acknowledge the 
first UNCTAD goal of nations contributing 1% of their GNP annually, claiming 
that since per capita income in Japan was comparatively lower than that of 
other donor nations, Japan could not be expected to meet this goal. They 
also showed their wariness towards aid programs by closely investigating 
the likelihood of each potential recipient to be able to use aid effectively in
9their development plans. (Rix, pp. 37-8)
An important agency was set up in 1961. The administration, at that 
time headed by Prime Minister Ikeda, established the Overseas Economic 
Cooperation Fund (OECF) to be more accountable to the concerns of the LDCs 
than the existing entities. It was empowered to give loans and credits on 
easier terms than those already being offered by Exim Bank, in hopes of 
offsetting international criticism of that institution. (Hasegawa, p. 140)
Yet the ministries were not prepared to relinquish any of their authority, 
and from the beginning OECF was a source of contention between them. All 
three believed that they alone should have control; instead the control was 
given to the EPA as a compromise. (Rix, pp. 35-6)
A third phase in Japan's foreign aid history spans from approximately 
the middle 1960s until the first oil shock of 1973. It was in this time 
frame that Japan experienced tremendous growth rates and truly came into 
her own as a major economic power. Other industrial nations were forced to 
reevaluate their perceptions of Japan. The club of donor nations renewed 
pressure on Japan to give more assistance in hopes of offsetting some of the 
rapid gains Japan was making economically. The other Western nations were 
beginning to feel threatened by Japan's rapid growth rates. The Japanese 
reaction was based on two characteristically Japanese desires. The first 
was the desire to be on good terms with other nations in order to promote 
the collective good of the international community. By that time Japan felt 
itself a genuine participant in the community and thus had the duty of honor
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to work with the group whenever possible. The second premise was based on 
Japanese ideas of hierarchically arranged relationships, which perceives a 
number of unequal levels or positions. Since Japan was gaining power and 
thus moving upwards in the hierarchy of nations it seemed reasonable to be 
expected to contribute more. (Hasegawa, p. 12)
The rapid economic growth also created internal pressures which 
affected the foreign aid policies. Japan is extremely dependent on a handful 
of nations for raw materials and food supplies. This necessitated good 
relations with those countries possessing an abundance of natural 
resources, many of which are in Southeast Asia. (Hasegawa, p. 66) Another 
domestic concern was the environmental deterioration , which was a direct 
result of Japan's success at developing such a strong heavy industry sector. 
Japan began to use the foreign aid program to encourage the LDCs to begin 
their own heavy industries. (Hasegawa, pp. 60-1) In response to these 
pressures the Industrial Structure Deliberation Committee was formed in
1971 to look for ways to improve the overall quality of life in Japan. Their
1972 report suggested several changes in aid policies to address the 
domestic situation;
1) make economic cooperation easier from the recipients
point of view by untying aid,
2) open Japanese markets to the LDCs so as to promote an
international division of labor,
3) formulate aid policies that were suited to the specific
needs of each recipient,
4) Promote foreign exchange programs as a way of
strengthening cooperation.
The committee hoped that these suggestions would lead Japan into a new 
era, in which the economy would be based on information centered 
industries rather that heavy industries. (Hasegawa, p. 88)
All of these pressures had a great effect on the amount of assistance 
Japan was offering. The chart below shows the dramatic increase in 
Japanese aid from 1962-1972, in comparison with several other top DAC 
donors.
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Japanese total flows ranked fifth in 1962, but by 1972 they had gained 
second place among the DAC nations. However, "less than one third of the 
total flow consisted of what might be regarded as genuine aid resources, 
such as grants, technical assistance, and contributions to multilateral 
agencies, while more than two-thirds of the total flow represents
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activities that were of a purely commercial and business nature."
(Hasegawa, p. 25)
The technical assistance program had been fairly unsuccessful at that 
point, even though the Japanese liked to think of themselves as particularly 
suited to the task of offering such training. OTCA was responsible for the 
training programs both inside and outside of Japan. (Hasegawa, pp. 122-3)
The primary problem facing technical assistance was the low amount of 
funding it received— in 1970 technical assistance received only 1.2% of the 
total aid flow. (Hasegawa, p. 30) The other major problem was the lack of 
language skills among those Japanese who have the necessary technical 
training. (Hasegawa, pp. 122-3)
During the third phase the attitudes of the ministries did not 
experience any major shifts. MITI and MOF continued to place Japan first in 
their considerations, although they were now focused on the concept of an 
international division of labor rather than the earlier concern of promoting 
growth. The MFA saw the other ministries as shortsighted in continuing to 
overlook the concerns of the LDCs while making aid decisions. MFA had 
people in daily contact with the LDCs and was much more perceptive of, and 
sensitive to their needs. They also realized that Japan could benefit if the 
LDCs as a group experienced substantial economic improvement. The opinion 
of MFA bureaucrats however, continued to be suppressed by the other two 
ministries. (Rix, p. 39) The three ministries did come together long enough 
in 1968 to accept the aim of aid comprising 1% of GNP eventually. In 1970
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they began to work towards 0.7% of QNP as an intermediate goal. (Rix, p. 39) 
Throughout this period Asia continued to be the primary target of 
Japanese aid although its importance did begin to decline slightly. For 
instance, in 1969, Asia received 90% of Japanese loans. By 1973 this figure 
was down to 80%. (Hasegawa, p. 61) The nations that received the greatest 
amounts of Japanese aid were the ones having the most to offer Japan in the 
way of raw materials.(Hasegawa, pp. 19-20)
Up through this period the ten most important recipients of Japanese 
aid were Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Brazil, South Korea, South Vietnam, 
Burma, the Philippines, Thailand, and Cambodia. (White, pp. 72-3) The 
ASEAN countries received such a high percentage of Japan's aid due to their 
importance as a source of raw materials, their strategic importance, and 
the persistence of their demands. (Rix, pp. 232-4) Up until the mid 1970s 
Africa received only tiny amounts of aid from Japan. Not only did Japan lack 
a cultural understanding of Africa such as they had with Southeast Asia, 
there were few benefits for Japan as far as trade was concerned. Nor was 
there the same type of visible recognition, due to the multilateral nature of 
much of the aid to Africa. (Rix, pp. 223-6) However, the 1970s brought a 
change in Japan's attitudes towards various regions in the world. The 1973 
oil shock played a large role in shifting aid to the Middle East, and also 
brought more of an interest in Africa. (Rix, p. 41)
In the 1970s Japan began to move from its preference for bilateral aid 
to multilateral aid. Contributions to organizations like the United Nations
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Development Program were increased for two reasons. First, Japan wanted 
to offset criticism from recipients and other donors who complained about 
the direct benefits Japan had been receiving from its aid programs.
Secondly, Japan saw increased contributions as a way to offset some of the 
increases in foreign reserves, thus contributing to a balance of trade that 
would be less threatening to other Western nations. (Hasegawa, pp. 115-8)
In the 1970s the attitudes of MITI and MOF once again remained fairly 
stable. MFA continued to become more supportive of aid and named five 
considerations to be taken for aid policy: international economic security, 
Japan's duty as an economic power, economic self-interest, humanitarian 
issues and diplomatic necessity. (Rix, pp. 41-3)
An important change in the aid bureaucracy took place in 1974 when the 
Japan International Coordination Agency (JICA) was established. Although 
its development stemmed from a growing desire to draw Japan's aid policies 
into one agency, JICA's scope did not become that broad. JICA ended up 
absorbing the duties of OTCA, the technical aid program, development 
funding, and the Japanese Overseas Cooperation Volunteers. (Rix, p. 49)
In 1978 politicians announced a plan to double Japan's Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) from 1978-1980. (OECD Review 1980, pp. 
115-116) What was not made public was the argument in the ministries 
over how to double aid. MFA and MITI were in favor of doubling aid in yen 
terms, while MOF and the EPA favored dollar terms. The difference was 
important; because of the yen's steady growth against the dollar, doubling
aid in dollar terms would require much less of an increase in funding than 
doubling aid in yen terms. MOFs support of counting the increase in dollars 
is one more example of their reluctance to give away Japanese funds. MOF 
won the argument on this occasion. (Rix p. 43)
By 1979 power was shifting and the OECF ended up being the backbone 
of the aid system. OECF had gained control of all loans which had a 25% 
grant element, and by 1979 they were administering virtually all of the ODA 
loans. (Rix, pp. 257-60) The power they gained was based on the valuable 
information the OECF possessed by implementing projects and then staying 
with them through a four or five year period. In this way they gained the 
specific knowledge of one country and one project which is so rare in 
Japan's generalist bureaucracy. (Rix, pp. 260-1)
The 1960s have brought about a new aid philosophy which tends to be 
more concerned with the needs of LDCs than ever before. Specific points of 
interest include support for agricultural development, development of 
energy sources, technical assistance, and the promotion of small and 
medium sized businesses in developing countries. All of this is aimed at the 
poorer people within the individual LDC. (Brooks and Orr. p. 237)
The shift in funding is not necessarily an abandonment of Japan's 
earlier attitudes towards economic assistance. Instead, it may be seen as 
an indication of how well the goals have been met. Some of the initial 
objectives set forth in the 1950s have been completely fulfilled; for 
example reconstruction from the war and the reestablishment of diplomatic
16
relations have been achieved, as has the goal of raising per capita income, 
now among the highest in the world. The new concern for the LDCs fits into 
those goals which by their very nature demand continuous striving; goals of 
regional stabilization and leadership.
Both bilateral ODA and multilateral contributions have continued to 
grow since the 1970s. Japan has set forth new targets for their aid program 
in the years of 1986-1992, which include increases in ODA as a percentage 
of GNP, improvements in the quality of ODA, plans to have total ODA 
disbursements in the time span to be over $40 billion so that 1992 
disbursements will be double the disbursements of 1985, in dollar terms. 
(OECD Review 1986, p. 73) In the 1980s Japanese aid has gone increasingly 
to countries outside of Asia. In the period from 1983-1984, the top five 
recipients were all from Asia, but two of the countries in the next grouping 
of five were Middle Eastern countries; Pakistan and Egypt. Kenya, Mexico, 
Peru, Turkey, Brazil, and Bolivia were also among the top twenty in 
individual recipients of Japanese bilateral aid. Multilateral ODA has 
increased from 14.9% of the Japanese ODA in 1970-1971, to 35.7% in 
1983-84. (OECD Review 1986, p. 251)
Pressure in the 1980s continues to push Japan to contribute more as 
trade imbalances increase. Infighting among the ministries slows down the 
process of bringing ODA up to the long promised 0.7% of GNP. It is difficult 
to increase bilateral aid due to recipients' inability to absorb it. And 
certain segments of the bureaucracy do not wish to increase multilateral
17
aid, due to a possible loss of political recognition in Asia. (FEER 13/6/85. 
pp. 86-7)
MOF has shown a willingness to increase multilateral aid to 
organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank, but not until Japan is 
offered an increased voting share in these institutions. (FEER 2/8/86, pp.
81-2)
There has also been recent talk of Japan's OECF becoming an alternative 
to the World Bank. This stems from the fact that OECF's loans are 
frequently on softer terms than those of the World Bank. There is hesitation 
over allowing the Japanese to have more influence in regions that are 
already seeing increases in direct investment by Japanese corporations.
(FEER 2/8/86, p.86)
After evaluating the development of the Japanese aid system, several 
unique characteristics stand out. One is the consistent level of 
self-concern evident in Japanese policy. Japan is generally quite honest 
about its self-serving goals, which are published regularly in government 
white papers. Efforts to change the focus have been largely superficial 
which is probably due to the fact that the efforts originate outside of Japan.
There is still no one agency with the power to coordinate all of Japan's 
aid programs. Traditionally, the Diet has not concerned itself directly with 
the workings of the system. Instead the Diet tends to impact the aid 
program through large sweeping policies such as long-term economic or 
diplomatic plans of which foreign aid is only a part. This distance between
18
the administration and the bureaucracy continues because aid programs are 
not an issue which attracts much public interest in Japan.
So the haggling between the powerful ministries continues to be the 
overwhelmingly important factor in shaping Japanese aid. MFA still is the 
most supportive for giving aid on the basis of political concerns. MOF has 
grudgingly continued to increase the amount of money available for aid 
programs, yet it continues to delay the fulfillment of the promised 1% GNP 
level. After all, this is a figure imposed upon Japan by the DAC, which 
dilutes any sense of urgency the Japanese might otherwise feel. The 
member nations have worked together to formulate goals like this; often 
Japan is a target for improvement. The conflict within the DAC is a result 
of the diversity of the members. Japan's aid system can be seen as farther 
from the middle ground then most.
MOTIVATIONS AND RATIONALES
There seems to be no single explanation for the phenomenon of 
economic assistance. The industrialized West has taken upon itself the 
burden of supplying aid to many, if not most of the world's less developed 
countries (LDCs). Yet when one tries to determine the rationale for the 
multitude of bilateral and multilateral aid programs one can only find a
19
handful of splintered motives rather than a cohesive set of reasons.
However, there is a consensus in the literature upon three foundations 
from which foreign aid programs spring . It seems *hat the motives of donor 
countries may by and large be fitted under the categories of economics, 
politics and/or moral responsibility.
The economic premise is the simplest. The underdevelopment of the 
third world is perceived as detrimental to the worldwide economic 
community as a whole. By providing aid, the wealthier nations will 
supposedly help the less developed countries to develop more quickly than 
they otherwise could. The sustained economic growth of all nations is seen 
as beneficial for everyone. For instance, this concept sees all nations 
prospering due to the increase in markets. More specifically, a donor 
country is likely to benefit from the use of their nation's products in the 
development programs that they are sponsoring. This is due to the fact that 
aid is often tied so that only the donor nations’ industries supply the 
necessary products for immediate use. In addition, donor nations hope that 
through the policy of tied aid, developing nations will become so accustomed 
to working with the products of the donor nation that they will choose to 
purchase these products even after the completion of the original aid 
program, thereby creating a long term demand for these products.
Political and national security interests provide a rationale that is the 
easiest to justify in the world of real politique. Under this rationale, 
foreign aid becomes part of a nation's overall foreign policy. Foreign aid
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has become an accepted responsibility of the industrialized countries. If a 
nation does not contribute an amount seen as appropriate to its economic 
strength, it will likely face a great deal of pressure from the other Western 
donor countries. This type of international pressure is especially important 
for the continuation of the various multilateral aid programs, which do not 
provide the obviously more direct opportunities for political influence in the 
recipient country. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development and its Development Assistance Committee provide a forum for 
discussions of foreign aid policies between the major Western donor 
nations.
Governments use bilateral aid programs in their foreign policies to a 
varying degree. They may be seeking to fit a recipient nation into a grand 
strategy. Over the years this has been especially true of the United States. 
The rhetoric of the Cold War was easily found in the first two decades of 
discussion on the question of foreign aid. One book on the strategies of aid 
programs put it this way.
...the primary purpose of foreign aid is to 
supplement and complement the efforts of the 
developing nations to enhance their strength and 
stability and to defend their freedom. Success in 
these efforts is necessary to counter the spread 
of Communism. (Black, p.18)
Although this was written in the mid 1960s it still presents an accurate 
description of one facet of U.S. foreign assistance goals. The aid to nations
21
like El Salvador and the continued support of the Contras in Nicaragua are 
examples of the continuation of this strain of analysis.
The degree of support varies depending on how important a role a 
particular country is playing in the "struggle." Aid ranges from direct 
military support to especially important nations, to support based on more 
humanitarian concerns to the less strategically placed nations.
When aid is being used for political purposes there is a fine line 
between preserving security, and interfering in a nation's internal political 
affairs. A foreign aid organization is in the delicate position of being 
between a domestic interest which expects to see a return on its foreign aid 
investment, and a recipient government which is closely guarding its own 
sovereignty. It is hard to determine how effectively donor countries are 
able to affect domestic affairs of the aid recipients. If the donor country 
does expect to be able to exert pressure, they need to formulate a clear plan 
of what they wish to accomplish in rather specific terms. Yet by doing so, 
they expose their aid organization to accusations of having crossed the line 
into interference. (Mason, p. 48) Perhaps this is why donor governments 
often mention their direct political objectives only after expressing their 
sense of moral responsibility to help Third World nations based on their 
humanitarian concerns.
The rationale that comes to mind quickest is that of moral 
responsibility. In the majority of the literature on foreign aid it is 
mentioned as the basis upon which all assistance is given. Yet it is often
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only mentioned in passing. For instance in a 1983 speech given by an 
official of the U.S. Department of State, humanitarian concerns were given 
less than a sentence of mention. It seems that such considerations did not 
play any role worth expounding on in the "quandary of foreign aid." (U.S. Dept, 
of State) Another writer on the topic says this of moral responsibility as 
motive:
Humanitarianism as a fundamental motivation has 
certainly played an important role in the actions 
of individual Americans, whether under private or 
public auspices, in the underdeveloped areas of 
the world....the general public has indicated a 
large reservoir of disinterested concern for the 
well-being of others. There is no doubt that these 
sentiments are reflected in substantial support 
for a foreign aid program without regard to 
national interests.(Mason, p. 27)
While this author gives greater credence to the importance of 
humanitarianism in this passage, it is written in the tone of an addendum.
Critics of the entire program of foreign aid go so far as to scoff at the 
idea of humanitarian foreign aid as hopelessly naive. Some take the attitude 
that moral responsibility is used as an almost unfair way of tricking the 
population into supporting economic assistance programs. (Bauer, chapter 
3)
There does seem to be a certain amount of truth in this cynical 
critique. Indeed governments with aid programs have been known to solicit 
support for these programs by making vague, lofty statements about the
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moral concern inherent in foreign aid programs. For instance, a report on 
foreign aid from a French commission stated:
...the first reason, sufficient in itself, for a 
French policy of co-operation with the Third 
Woild is the feeling which France has of her 
duties towards humanity. (Riddell, p. 6)
The Swedes make reference to "international solidarity and responsibility" 
and to concepts of "human dignity" and "social equality." The British have 
expressed similar sentiments, asking themselves "Could the moral and 
social foundations of their own societies [those of rich countries] remain 
firm and steady if they washed their hands of the plight of others?" 
(Riddell, p. 7)
Most stylistic of all was President Kennedy in his inaugural address:
To those people in the huts and villages of half 
the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass 
misery, we pledge our best efforts to help them 
to help themselves, for whatever period is 
required-not because the Communists may be 
doing it, not because we seek their votes, but 
because it is right. If a free society cannot help 
the many who are poor, it cannot save the few 
who are rich. (Riddell, pp. 6-7)
In spite of the fact that these statements are often used for their 
emotional pull, there is a strong tradition of aiding those less fortunate n 
the major donor countries, and their aid programs build upon this tradition.
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Among the citizens of donor countries, the strongest aid supporters tend to 
be those who are moved by personal moral convictions. The foreign policy 
strategists are thus able to bury their more pragmatic and seemingly sordid 
rationales beneath a veneer of humanitarianism. Politicians are then in a 
better position to vote for the funding for these humanitarian programs. 
Through a collective sense of moral responsibility the government and 
people of a donor nation can convince themselves that programs in their 
political self-interest are being carried out for the good of others.
There are a variety of different beginnings for the moral responsibility 
rationale. These justifications have developed out of various Western 
philosophical traditions. Roger Riddell identifies six philosophies from 
which the rationale may have evolved: (Riddell, pp. 13-24)
(I) The ethical standards of Christianity provide a strong case for 
aiding those less fortunate. This is supported by both the scriptures and 
formal announcements of the religious organizations themselves.
(II) The concept of "human good" stems from the framework of 
universal human rights. This rationale sees a human community with every 
member possessing the same basic needs and also the rights to fulfill those 
needs regardless of what part of the world they inhabit. Therefore the third 
world poor have the right to life's basic necessities.
(III) The "theory of justice" is a similar concept. The consideration is 
what harm may be inflicted on those who do not have what they need. 
Supporters of this way of thought believe that equality is implied in the
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concept--where one society has a surplus it is their responsibility to see 
that those in need receive their due. All people, whether individually or in 
an organized fashion have a responsibility to prevent the harm caused by the 
lack of life's necessities.
(IV) Utilitarianism comes from a different angle. It approaches 
morality with rationality and pragmatism, looking for whatever action will 
produce the most happiness. It is assumed that the act of wealthy nations 
giving to the poorer nations will create more happiness than if this act did 
not take place. This straightforward approach has proved to be satisfying 
enough to have been included as an aid rationale in the 1980 Development 
Assistance Committee Review.
(V) John Rawls takes utilitarianism a step further. His contractual 
theory of justice is composed of a set of principles and priority rules which 
are designed to correspond to our intuitive sense of justice. According to 
Riddell, Rawls' theory provides for "assistance for the specific relief of 
poverty and, in the general conception of justice, the equal distribution of 
all social primary goods unless an unequal distribution is to the advantage 
of the least favored....people have rights to life ...they have rights to the 
resources necessary to create the conditions for a basic life, even if 
acquiring these resources entails the extraction of these resources acquired 
legitimately by others." (Riddell, pp. 22-3)
(VI) The final base for humanitarian aid discussed by Riddell is that of 
"justice as desert." The basic precept is that the plight of the less
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developed countries is due at least in part to the developed nations 
exploitation of these countries. It is argued that this makes the wealthier 
nations responsible to provide a type of moral retribution.
This final concept is one that has definitely been identified as a 
motivation for aid in the case of nations that provide assistance to former 
colonies. In many of these countries the population , and hence the 
government are susceptible to former colonies who work to capitalize on 
this sense of collective guilt.
Aid in the Western world is coordinated by several international 
entities. The dominant organization is the Development Assistance 
Committee of the OECD. Within the charter of these organizations the 
rationales and motivations of economic cooperation are put forth as a 
framework for action. It is clear that these countries have come together on 
the strength of the economic rationale. In the statement that member 
nations will "...consult each other on all other relevant aspects of their 
development assistance policies..." the door is left open to reproach each 
other on the basis of other rationales as well. In this way DAC members 
have been able to call for certain levels of aid as they pass judgment on the 
quality of each others' assistance.
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development was set up under a Convention signed 
in Paris on 14th December 1960 by the Member 
countries of the Organisation for European
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Economic Co-operation and by Canada and the 
United States. This Convention provides that the 
OECD shall promote policies designed:
— to achieve the highest sustainable economic 
growth and employment and a rising standard of 
living in Member countries, while maintaining 
financial stability, and thus to contribute to the 
world economy;
— to contribute to sound economic expansion in 
Member as well as non-member countries in the 
process of economic development;
— to contribute to the expansion of world 
trade on a multilateral non-discriminatory basis 
in accordance with international obligations.
....In order to achieve its aims the OECD has set up 
a number of specialized committees. One of these 
is the Development Assistance Committee, whose 
Members have agreed to secure an expansion of 
the aggregate volume of resources made available 
to less-developed countries and to improve their 
effectiveness. To this end, Members periodically 
review together both the amount and the nature of 
their contributions to aid programmes, bilateral 
and multilateral, and consult each other on all 
other relevant aspects of their development 
assistance policies.
The Members of the Development Assistance 
Committee are Australia, Austria, Belgium.
Canada, Denmark. France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
the Netherlands, Norway. Portugal, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United 
States, and the Commission of the European 
Economic Community.(OECD 1972 Review, p. 4)
The nations who are included on this list are commonly referred to as 
the nations of the "West" or "the North" as though they comprised a single 
entity. Indeed, for all their differences, they do share a certain cultural 
heritage. The weight of Western Civilization, from ancient Greece through 
the Roman Empire, and then the development of the European and North
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American continents have been the experiences that have shaped their 
essence. This holds true for all of these nations, except Japan. These days, 
Japan is included in the category of Western nations due to its economic 
prowess. In the context of international relations, or that of economic 
development, Japan is indeed a member of the community of Western 
nations. In the context of economic assistance the connection is not as 
obvious. Certainly Japan has been one of the largest sources of economic 
assistance in the Western world for many years now. But the nature of the 
Japanese foreign aid program has always differed from that of its fellow 
DAC members. For as long as Japan has been offering economic assistance it 
has been the target of criticism from the recipients of their aid and 
consequently from their fellow donors. Japan is not a Western nation in the 
cultural sense of the word. Its social systems did not originate in Greece, 
and there was no Renaissance that focused on the glory of the individual.
The differences in the aid programs of the Japanese and those of the oth er 
Western donors that lead to these criticisms are a result of the differences 
in their historical backgrounds. The truly "Western” nations have a tradition 
of moral responsibility towards the less fortunate in their midst. This 
tradition has been the wellspring of their foreign aid programs. The 
rationales offered by Roger Riddell for humanitarianism in economic 
assistance programs can all be traced to Western culture. Today's aid 
programs are often tested against a formula of political and strategic 
calculations in order to prove meir worth to those who question what their
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nation is receiving in return for its assistance. However, a sense of moral 
responsibility inherent in these societies underlies the more sordid 
realities of todays world. The Japanese aid program does not have these 
same underpinnings.
Their aid program was not sold on its metaphysical merits. Instead, it 
was a result of the Western nations' sense of moral responsibility. In 
Japan's case the West judged the nation guilty of crimes that demanded 
reparations. Before the West would reaccept Japan as a valid member of the 
international community the Japanese had to prove their worth by atoning 
for past mistakes. As the first reparation programs were being planned,
Japan was pushed to expand the program by the United States.
Japan needed to be a part of the Western world if it was to fully 
recover from the devastation of the war. But the nation did not go so far as 
to incorporate the complex humanitarian rationale into the assistance 
program forced upon it. Although it would not have paid reparations without 
being force to do so, once the program was begun the Japanese worked to 
turn it to their advantage. The list of goals for the Japanese aid program did 
not include becoming an altruistic nation. It has always been easy to 
observe that the Japanese intended to use their aid program to further their 
own economic development. As the demands of the Japanese economy have 
changed, so have the policies of the assistance programs changed to better 
serve these demands.
Over the years the Japanese have used their economic assistance
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programs to serve two basic goals. The first is the furtherance of their own 
economy. The second goal has been first, to gain admittance to the club of 
international powers, and later, to improve their standing in the same. As a 
result, Japan's assistance programs have undergone constant criticism as 
being too self-serving; however, Japan generally escapes the label of 
hypocrisy that falls upon other nations that hide their self-interests under a 
cloak of good deeds. Japan has responded to pressure from the other donor 
nations with superficial efforts to adjust the programs just enough to 
silence the critics for the time being. As far as humanitarianism is 
concerned, the Japanese have at various times made reference to their duty 
to help the LDCs in their endeavors for a higher quality of life. These 
statements have generally not been on the same level as references to 
humanitarian concerns made by other, Western nations. It seems that these 
pronouncements by the Japanese are pulled from the sense of duty inherent 
in being an international power and it is only due to their position as such 
that the Japanese feel this duty. Certainly the other Western donors also 
feel this duty. In addition though, they have a sense of trying to expand the 
progress they have made towards economic equality within their own 
societies to the rest of the world. Japan has not allowed itself to be 
pressured into generosity for generosity's sake, and there is no evidence 
that it would ever lend its programs to economic assistance as a worldwide 
welfare system, such as that favored by the Scandinavian nations.
Japan has tended to shy away from making use of its economic power in
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an explicitly political way. In general Japanese foreign policy is an 
extension of the country's economic concerns. This has been especially true 
in relations with Southeast Asia. Whenever Japan appears to be exerting 
its power the nations of this region become very anxious. The expansionist 
Japan of World War II has not been forgotten or even entirely forgiven. So 
Japan has not used its foreign aid policies in the same political sense as 
nations like the U .S ., the U.K., or France.
7HE BURMESE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEM
If Japan truly plans its aid programs on the basis of economic 
potential, rather than political or humanitarian concerns, then the nations 
who have consistently received Japanese aid must logically exhibit 
economic potential strong enough to have piqued the interest of the 
Japanese. An examination of Burma's economic viability should therefore 
reveal factors that have kept the Japanese committed to providing 
assistance to it Because of the historical and continuing importance of 
socialism in Burma, the government and the economic system must be looked 
at hand in hand.
Burmese anticolonialism was built upon an intellectual foundation of 
Buddhist philosophy and socialist nationalism. (Steinberg, p. 31.) Socialism
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had come to be a part of the Burmese elite's political culture during their 
education in Britain. For their situation socialism provided a path of escape 
from foreign domination. By turning their backs on Britain's capitalist 
system, the Burmese nationalists were also escaping from imperialism and 
foreign domination as well. (Steinberg #2, p. 29)
The Burmese gained their independence in 1945. From 1948 until 1952 
the country was in the throes of civil war. The fighting continued 
sporadically throughout the 1950s; the main issue was the position of the 
many different ethnic groups within the new state. The continuous turmoil 
led to a military caretaker government being asked to take control, which 
they did from 1958-1960. Although a civilian government was elected in 
1960 it was unable to sove the problems any better than earlier civilian 
governments. (Taylor, p. 217) In 1962 the military once again took charge 
in a nearly bloodless coup.
The military takeover was led by a six member Revolutionary Council, 
of which General Ne Win was leader. There were three major issues 
threatening the continuation of the young state at the time of the coup; 
continued ethnic tensions, a controversy over making Buddhism the state 
religion, and an economy which had not yet recovered from World War II. 
(Steinberg, pp. 21 -23)
Initially the military takeover was viewed favorably by both the 
Burmese and overseas Burma watchers. Ne Win was expected to return the 
country to the relative order of the earliest military government. (Taylor,
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pp. 291) Within two months of the coup, the Revolutionary Council released 
their goals for the state in The Burmese Way to Socialism. This treatise has 
been the ideological foundation of the government ever since. It states that 
the people must be freed from evil economic systems by the just 
establishment of a socialist state. It promises that this economic change 
will improve the moral well-being of the nation because it will do away 
with all of the evils that cause immorality.
The Revolutionary Council supported these goals further through the 
formation of the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) in mid 1962. At 
the time of its formation the BSPP's main function was as a "...means for the 
mobilization of support for the state." (Taylor, pp. 315) By February of 1963 
more action was taken to facilitate socialism. The government announced 
the intention to nationalize internal and external means of production and 
distribution. The Burma Oil Company and all banking institutions were 
among the first to be nationalized. At the same time the creation of any 
new private industry was prohibited. (Steinberg, pp. 35)
As the BSPP consolidated its power during the first decade of military 
rule, Burma turned in upon itself, isolation was judged to be an important 
part of the path to socialism. On a foreign policy level Burma was a member 
of the non-aligned movement. Neutrality was seen as the best way to keep 
the country free from the intervention of more powerful nations.
Although not much is known about economic planning in Burma from 
1963-1971, it is known that most effort was focused on promoting the
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growth of heavy industry. Even though investment priorities were given to 
industry its growth was quite slow. (Steinberg, pp. 36-37) There were 
many factors which contributed to the problems of industrialization. One 
very basic problem was that when the military came to power they purged 
most of the bureaucracy, which left a dearth of qualified people to manage 
all of the newly nationalized businesses. The military personnel who 
replaced the purged bureaucrats were unable to compensate for this lack. 
(Steinberg, pp. 35-36) Other problems included the practice of investing in 
new "show” plants instead of updating the existing facilities. This resulted 
in older plants producing at very inefficient levels due to their undependable 
obsolete equipment. Related to the problem of poorly qualified bureaucrats 
were the poor pricing policies, which were all made centrally. That there 
was no autonomy for local management also contributed to the poor 
performance. Worker discontent was yet another issue. They worked for 
very low wages without any incentive to perform well. This in turn led to 
low productivity. (Steinberg, pp. 37)
All of these issues combined to create economic stagnation. Standards 
of living remained below the prewar levels. Poverty became widespread. 
Income distribution was the most evenly spread of all countries in the 
region; however, it was obtained by the income of those in the urban areas 
declining, instead of the other way around, as is the usual case. (Steinberg, 
pp. 38)
In 1972 the government changed directions in an attempt to halt the
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deterioration of the economy. The B8PP began claiming that it was a party 
for the masses, instead of a nucleus party of prestigious military men. 
Supposedly, the BSPP was to lead the state Instead of only supporting it 
through the military. (Taylor, pp. 315) The First Congress of the BSPP was 
held In the Summer of 1971, and the new face of the BSPP was formally 
presetilet| In f|l© Lotto la im  and Short-Term Economic Policies of the Burma 
.Socialist h u flia u u m i’fllly  The new priorities of the BSPP were 
summarized as:
a) The first priority is to expand production in 
agriculture, fishery, livestock and forestry 
sectors, and to increase their exports,
b) The second priority is to set up consumer 
goods industries to substitute imports by 
expansion of agriculture, fishery, livestock 
and forestry sectors, and to increase their 
exports.
c) The third priority is to raise mineral 
production to th9 highest possible level and to 
lay foundations for heavy industry based on 
such miners! production.(Steinberg, pp. 44-5)
At this time the party also announced a Twenty-Year Plan, to be divided 
into four Five Year Plans. The 1972 reforms recommitted the government to 
obtain prosperity through socialism. It was recognized that to realize this 
goal the government would have to concentrate their developmental efforts 
upon the natural resources of Burma. In addition material incentives were 
to be provided to the workers so they would be inspired to work harder. The 
importance of the private sector was also recognized, in the hopes of
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gaining control of the black market. It was necessary to allow the private 
sector the freedom to meet consumer demand. A final reform was the 
decision to emerge from the self-imposed economic isolation. It was 
recognized that outside assistance would be necessary if Burma truly 
wanted to develop. (Steinberg, pp. 44-7)
The reforms of the early 1970s were expected to help Burma obtain 
significant growth rates. Certainly the abundance of natural resources 
provided Burma with goat potential for development.
Burma has the opportunity to capitalize on in raised agricultural yield, 
further development of its forests and fisheries, and mining and oil 
resources. In addition the country could be expected to benefit from its 
relatively small population and low growth rates. The society is highly 
literate for the region and education receives a high degree of support from 
the population. (Steinberg, pp. 180-181) With all of these factors in their 
favor it is surprising, at first glance, that today much of the development 
potential remains unfulfilled.
Burma has faced just as many obstructions in its push tor development 
as it has favorable factors. The continuing struggles with insurgencies by 
the various ethnic factions and the Communists have necessitated large 
military budgets. These costs have been a constant strain on the 
government's budget. The ineffectiveness of the bureaucracy has been a 
constraint oi, growth. The BSPP has kept tight control on who is allowed 
into the bureaucracy. Unfortunately the people who are trusted by the BSPP
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are not usually very-well trained for their positions. The bureaucracy is 
also noted for its corruption. This is a contributing factor for another of 
the Burmese quandaries-that of the black market. The government has not 
yet come to terms with the proper role of the private sector, hence the 
black market smuggling continues to drain the economy. The problems with 
the inefficient distribution of agricultural commodities and consumer goods 
all contribute to the continuation of the black market. These problems are 
by and large continuations of the issues Bumia has faced throughout its 
years of independence. (Steinberg, pp. 164-175)
With all of these economic shortcomings some may come to the 
conclusion that the socialist ideology of the BSPP is preventing Burma from 
developing. Some analysts do point to the centralized state control of the 
economy as an impediment. (Taylor, p. 341) Other analysts, however, have 
looked beneath this factor and come to the conclusion that the priority the 
BSPP has given militarism and strict isolationism are more at fault. (E'lU, 
Country Profile, pp. 38-40) It appears that the inflexible political system 
of the BSPP is more to blame than the socialist ideology, which has been 
relatively flexible. (Steinberg, pp. 163-4)
Decision making takes place at the highest levels of the system, due to 
a lack of knowledgeable lower level bureaucrats in the executive branch of 
government. (Steinberg, pp. 170-172) There is a high degree of overlap 
between the leadership of the military, the party, and the government. (EIU 
Country Profile, p.35) These two facts have had a very negative effect upon
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the state's ability to formulate foreign policy. Maung Maung Gyi, a historian 
and political scientist, has formulated five hypotheses which explain the 
basic patterns of Burmese foreign policy since the military takeover.
(Maung Maung Gyi, pp. 10-11)
The first of the hypotheses defines his concept of "negative 
neutralism" as a passive, reactive policy based on the xenophobic tendencies 
of the Burmese. He sees the country's leaders as self-serving and narrow 
minded.
The second hypothesis asserts that the BSPP/military leaders have 
followed this policy as a way of preserving the social/political system they 
have created. They are continually seeking legitimacy.
This fear of survival has created a wariness of the international 
economic system. In their desire to stay free of the foreign influence 
inherent in international investment and trade the Burmese isolated 
themselves until economic necessity forced them to open their doors to 
economic assistance and investment.
Although Burma's development has stagnated as a result of severe 
isolation, Maung Maung Gyi sees benefits in the policy of neutralism. The 
fourth hypothesis explains how tire Burmese have been spared many of the 
troubles caused by intervention and consequent wars in neighboring nations 
of South East Asia. Burma has by and large been left alone to pursue its own 
interests.
The fifth hypothesis recognizes that the military elite is completely
39
committed to preserving the ideology they have created in order to hold onto 
their power. He comments on the probability of continued insurgency from 
the various factions that are not content to continue on the "Burmese Way to 
Socialism.”
Soon after the BSPP came to power it became clear that they were 
moving the country into isolation. In the strategic realm the fact that the 
Burmese military capability is for all purposes limited to within the 
nation's boundaries keeps the nation from posing a threat to its neighbors. 
This keeps the Burmese secure from interference in their internal affaiis.
In order to continue this favorable situation the Burmese decided upon the 
position of non-alignment which would keep foreign influence from shifting 
the delicate balance of international relations. (Taylor, p. 356)
As Burma moved into isolation, they severed many of the ties that 
could have been helpful in its development. One of the first consequences of 
Burma's shift to a stronger neutral foreign policy was the redefinition of 
the nation's foreign assistance regulations. Due to its colonial history,
Burma had access to many groups who provided assistance out of the sense 
of "justice as dessert.” However, Burma did not want to help assuage the 
guilt of its former colonizers. Private aid groups were prohibited from 
operating in Burma; organizations like the Ford Foundation, the Asia 
Foundation, and the British Council were all sent home. (Steinberg, pp. 
39-41)
In general the Burmese eschewed all foreign assistance. This is not
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surprising. Investment from foreign firms was seen as compromising 
Burmese independence; accepting economic assistance was also considered 
distasteful. Burma wanted to be free of the influence of the decadent 
Western nations who offered the bulk of available aid. It was compromising 
in the sense of the strategic motives and also the humanitarian ones. During 
the first ten years of military rule the Burmese did their best to stay free 
of the contamination of foreign assistance.
MUTUAL BENEFIT AND ACCEPTANCE
When World War II ended, the Japanese-Burmese relationship was 
turned upside down. No longer a coic .iial master, Japan was compelled to 
provide reparations to those nations who demanded them. Burma was one of 
those nations. The reparations agreements were legally grounded in the San 
Francisco peace treaty, excerpted below.
Japan will promptly enter into negotiations 
with Allied Powers so desiring, whose present 
territories were occupied by Japanese forces and 
damaged by Japan, with a view to assisting to 
compensate those countries for the cost o f  
repairing the damage done, by making available 
the services of the Japanese people in production, 
salvaging, and other work for the Allied Powers in 
question. Such arrangements shall avoid the 
imposition of additional liabilities on other
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Allied Powers, and, where the manufacturing of 
raw materials is called for, they shall be supplied 
by the Allied Powers in question, so as not to 
throw any foreign exchange burden upon Japan.
(Hasegawa, p. 38)
As discussed in the section on the development of the Japanese aid 
program, Japan also used its reparations program to meet various foreign 
policy goals such as improving diplomatic relations and as an opportunity to 
help in the economic recovery program.
For Burma and Japan the reparations payments were the beginning of a 
relationship of foreign assistance that persists to this day. This section of 
this thesis will attempt to synthesize the trends that have characterized 
this unlikely relationship. On the one hand is Japan, a nation which has been 
one of the largest suppliers of economic assistance to countries all over the 
world. On the other hand is Burma, a rather insignificant player in the 
international community. However odd it appears at first glance, this 
relationship has persevered through all of the turbulence.
The reason the aid program has been so strong for four decades is Japan 
and Burma's ability to match their foreign aid goals so well. Both parties 
have gained enough from the relationship to ensure its continuance.
Lucian Pye attributes several characteristics to the Burmese political 
culture which may provide a somewhat better understanding of how the two 
peoples are able to cooperate so easily. As mentioned earlier Burmese 
political decision-making capabilities tend to be concentrated in the elites.
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This might make negotiations with the Japanese progress more smoothly due 
to the fact that Japanese bureaucratic decision making works in the 
opposite direction. In the Japanese bureaucracy lower-level officials often 
make many of the decisions themselves without having to go through 
numerous consultations with their superiors on every detail. It is likely 
that when the foreign aid packages are being coordinated it is lower or 
medium level Japanese officials who are working with the higher ranking 
Burmese officials. This places the <wo groups with the negotiating power in 
contact with each other.
Pye also portrays Burmese elites as uncomfortable when they are put in 
position to make important decisions which would strongly affect the 
economy. On the other hand when the Japanese contribute economic 
assistance they have a clear idea of exactly upon which segment of the 
economy they want to focus their energy. The relationship between Japan 
and Burma would not be seen as one of equality in Japan. The concept of 
hierarchy between nations would clearly relegate Burma to the lower status 
position. Japan would not hesitate to implement its own programs 
decisively as the senior partner. It seems probable that the Burmese would 
be willing to let the Japanese take the responsibility, to a certain extent, to 
make the decisions as to which projects to work on at any one time.
To turn back to the more statistically-oriented reasons for such long 
cooperation takes one back to the post-war era. Burma received reparations 
payments from Japan from the mid-1950s through the mid 1960s. (Taylor,
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p. 355) Burma primarily received capital goods that it would not have 
otherwise purchased; after all the Japanese did not want to cut into the 
potential for expanding into the Burmese markets. The Balu-Chaung electric 
power project was the center piece of the reparations program. The 
Japanese contributed over $30 million and had more than 230 technicians at 
work on the project. (Hasegawa, p. 50) The table below shows other 
projects that Japanese reparations helped to finance.
JAPANESE REPARATIONS AND JffiP ARATJQN-LIKE PAYMENTS
M :!«]:«7, TM : f l |  ill J si £#M *
Balu-Chaung Electric Power Station 10,390
Large and Medium Truck Assembly and Passenger Car Plants 2,530
Small Truck Assembly Plants 3,295
Home Electric Appliance Assemblv Factories 3,095
Agricultural Machinery Factories 1,589
Electrical Machinery and Equipment 5,857
Vehicles (Trains) 8,353
T e x tile  M a c h in e ry _________________________________________________ ZML
source :Hasegawa, p. 51 in ¥ million
It is easy to see why Burma desired these projects. Each project either 
supports Burma's industrialization goals directly, as in the Electric 
Machinery project, or else contributed to the Burmese infrastructure, and 
thus indirectly supported industrialization.
Japan's interests are only slightly more complex. One of the 
motivations for the expansionism of World War II was Japan's need for 
access to mineral resources. These needs certainly did not end with the
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war. If anything Japanese needs for resources became more acute with the 
end of the wat and the loss of access to China when the People's Republic of 
China was four:ded.(Tanaka, p. 75) In addition io possessing various 
minerals to which the Japanese hoped to gain access, Burma also fit neatly 
Japan's perception of Southeast Asia as a potential market for Japanese 
products and factories. (Tanaka, p. 55) At the time of the reparations Japan 
was operating under the Income-Doubling Plan of 1960. Heavy industry was 
the base upon which the tremendous growth rates were built, and the 
Japanese government spared no effort to help these industries find markets 
for their products. Burma received these types of products as reparations 
and thus fit quite well into Japan's economic recovery plans.
Given Japan's commitment to the U.S. position of anti-communism it 
would not be surprising if conflicts had developed between Japan and Burma 
when the military took control of the country, and instituted a more radical 
form of government. However this was not the case.
First, as explained earlier, the regime was generally viewed favorably 
by Burma observers. Secondly, Japan was actually in favor of third world 
nations nationalizing foreign corporations. In the post-war era Japan did 
not possess the capital or technology necessary for securing access to 
various mineral resources. These resources were overwhelmingly controlled 
by American, British, or French multinational corporations. When the third 
world nations took control Japan was then able to negotiate directly for 
their resources instead of having to go through older corporations. (Tanaka,
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pp. 16-17)
When the Revolutionary Council leadership decided to send the private 
assistance groups home they became more dependent on the Japanese. Japan 
was unique in the relatively high degree of contact it had with the Burmese 
in the first decade of military rule. The hydroelectric plant at Balu-Chaung 
was crucial for the Burmese because it was to provide most of the power to 
the urban regions, including Rangoon. In the years 1955-1970, Burma 
received $450 million in loans, grants, goods, and services. (Steinberg, pp. 
39-41) With all of the stated distaste for foreign assistance the BSPP was 
unable to continue growth programs successfully without Japanese aid. 
(Steinberg, pp. 181-182)
The 1960s were the period of rapid economic growth in Japan. Along 
with economic growth came a rapid increase in Japanese consumption of 
minerals and fuels. In the period from 1963 to 1973 Japanese consumption 
of resources including oil, copper, zinc, aluminum, and nickel grew at an 
average annual rate from 10-20%. This consumption was primarily in the 
industrial sector, rather than the consumer sector. (Tanaka, pp. 25-26).
This meant that MITI had a strong interest in securing mineral resources.
MITI had very strong connections to the mineral industry; with the coalition 
that exists between the ruling Liberal Democrat Party, the bureaucracy and 
business in Japan, the mineral industries did not have difficulty in obtaining 
unity between various interests in promoting resource access. (Tanaka, pp. 
13-15) By the late 1960s governmental agencies were pushing for Japanese
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companies to take charge of developing Japanese access to resources. Also 
recommended was "resource diplomacy....[intended]....to smooth the ground 
between the governments of Japan and the producer country so that private 
companies can launch resource development promptly." (Tanaka, p.47)
In 1971, MITI released a Natural Resources White Paper which said in
part:
"Now that the resource question is more a 
major concern of the state than of private firms 
in developing countries, it is essential to deploy 
an active resource diplomacy in order to keep 
good relationships with these countries." 
(Tanaka, p.53)
Several years later, in 1970 this policy could be seen in action in 
Burma. The Burmese had reorganized their oil company, renaming it Myama 
Oil Corporation. The Burmese were interested in exploring their potential 
for offshore oil developments. Japanese oil companies became involved, and 
backed by yen loans from the Japanese government they sponsored surveys 
for oil.
When Burma made its economic policy turnaround in 1972 with the 
release of the Long-Term and Short-Term Economic Policies of the Burmese 
Socialist Programme Party they recognized that they must begin actively to 
pursue economic assistance if they wanted to promote the growth they 
needed in the industrial sector that was an important step towards a 
socialist state. (Steinberg, p.49) David Steinberg explains the delicate
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situation the BSPP leadership was in when they were contemplating this 
changed attitude towards foreign aid.
"Too great a reliance on foreign assistance, or too 
obvious a need for it and a foreign presence that 
seems to make the Burmese subordinate in their 
own country, could well trigger once again the 
nascent nationalist and xenophobic sentiments 
that are so strong in Burma. There is a delicate 
balance between extensive assistance that can be 
absorbed on worthwhile activities and too great a 
physical or r'olicy presence, creating resentment." 
(S*ei iberg, p.188)
Due to the predominant role Japan had played during the first decade of 
military rule Japan was in the perfect position for its needs as Burma 
slowly opened to more involvement with the international economic order. 
Japan continued to be the largest source of economic assistance throughout 
the 1970s. Depending on the sources one reads the actual figures may 
differ. Here are „ome of the figures on the amount of assistance Burma 
received through the 1970s.
* from 1974-1982 foreign grants provided an average of 5.1 % of 
total state revenues. (Taylor, p.346)
* from 1972-1979 Japan was the source for 55% of the bilateral 
loans received by Burma. (Steinberg #2, p. 48)
* in 1970-1971 Japan loaned Burma $7.7 million
* in 1976-1977 Japan provided $134.4 million in support.
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* in 1977-1978 Japan provided $128.1 million in support. (Steinberg,
P-58)
It has been noted by a number of observers that Japanese aid is used to 
benefit Japan. Shoko Tanaka writes th a tH ....project aid has been utilized as 
an effective way of acquiring resources and exporting Japanese projects." 
(Tanaka, p.55) The OECD notes in its 1973 Review of the DAC activities that 
Japan seems quite committed to aiding LDCs improve the quality of products 
with export potential. After noting the various ways in which Japan aids 
the LDCs in their endeavors they add "in many cases the intended market is 
Japan...."(OECD Review 1973) In the section on development of the aid 
structure in Japan it is noted that Japan was hoping to use its foreign aid 
program to develop heavy industry in the LDCs as a way of lessening the toll 
pollution was taking on Japan's lifestyle.
Japan continued to look for oil in Burma. After the 1973 oil shock this 
became an even more urgent issue for the Japanese. Burma had allowed 
foreign companies to serve as contractors for exploration and productions of 
oil in 1974. In 1977 Japan extended yen credits to Burma to help build the 
Mann Refinery. (Tanaka, pp. 109-111) This plant enabled the Burmese to be 
self sufficient in oil and petroleum products for several years. In 1980 the 
Japanese were able to import Burmese oil for a short time. Unfortunately, 
production was not able to be sustained at this level, cutting short Burmese 
potential. Not only was Burma unable to continue exporting oil, they now
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suffer shortages at home. (EIU Country Profile, p. 49) Japanese oil 
companies also helped to discover the natural gas reserves in the Gulf of 
Martaban.
During the 1970s period of increased foreign assistance some of 
Burma's fears of "foreign domination" were realized, to a degree, by the 
emergence of a debt problem. In the first decade of military rule Burma 
borrowed an average of $28 million per year. This amount increased rapidly 
after the policy changes of 1972, so that in 1979 Burma borrowed $350 
million. As a result, by 1984 the debt service ratio (gross external 
liability/GNP [%]) was 36.3%. (Taylor, p. 347)
The relative positions of the two nations in the international 
community have shifted in the 1980s. Burma has become more dependent on 
foreign assistance, accepting aid from a number of different nations and 
multilateral organizations. International trade has also become more 
important to the Burmese. In fact the fifth four year plan specifically 
mentioned the possibility of economic cooperation with foreign entities in 
high technology and capital intensive development projects. (EIU Country 
Profile, p. 36)
DISTRIBUTION OF TRADE . (AS A % OF TOT AD
Exports
China
7.7 9.5 8.1 6.7 6.4 7.5
11.9 8.8 17.4 12.3 13.2 11.4
1.6 1.6 4.0 12.8 9.5 7.1
Japan 
Eur. Comm. 
India
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Imports
China
^Bjj/B1 81 /Bg 
3.2
fj2j83 ^3/84 BS/B6
3.7
Japan 43.2 47.6 37.5 33.7 38.2 43.6
Eur. Comm. 21.4 25.2 28.7 25.8 20.6 26.7
India 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.1
source :EIU Country Profile, p. 60
The figures above show how Japan dominated Burma's trade relations as 
well as their assistance program.
in the mid 1980s Burma's debt problem caused them to seek UN 
classification as a "least-developed country", which they did achieve. They 
have also become more aggressive in seeking to obtain assistance in the 
form of grants rather than loans. In fact Burma actually feii behind in 
repayments to Japan in 1987 and in the year after that received ¥6.5 billion 
in debt relief. (FEER 8/25/88, pp. 10-11)
The Japan of the 1980s is more willing than the Japan of earlier years 
to use its foreign aid program in an attempt to influence a country's 
political situation. Japan has joined other Western nations in calling for a 
number of reforms including currency stabilization, gradual privatisation of 
state enterprises, rebuilding of transportation and communication 
enterprises, more realistic pricing of public utilities services, continued 
efforts to expand the oil fields and diversification in agriculture. (FEER 
8/25/88, p. 14) Since the Burmese government had estimated that 34% of 
capital spending needed to be financed by foreign aid, (FEER 10/13/88, p.18) 
and that Japan was supplying approximately 60% of Burma's bilateral aid,
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these demands for economic liberalization had to be taken very seriously. 
(EIU no. 4, p. 29)
Japan has been taking a harder line with the Burmese in regards to 
their requests for more grant aid , and for lower interest rates on the yen 
loans they receive. In early 1988 Japan granted the Burmese a total of 
¥28,119.6 million to be used for such goods and projects as food production 
machinery, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals and even a new teaching hospital in 
Mandalay. (EIU no. 2, p. 31) So when the Burmese planning and finance 
minister came to Tokyo in April 1988 MOF insisted that Burma must improve 
its economic performance before they received any more grants. (FEER, 
8/25/88, pp. 10-11)
Even with the resistance from MOF, aid continued to flow through the 
spring of 1988. In April Japan signed a grant agreement which was to 
provide Burma with steel and iron for various construction projects. (EIU no.
2, p. 31) Also in April Japan announced its intention to convert the 
remainder of Burma's outstanding debt on loans made prior to 1978 into 
grants; this was a total of ¥77.2 billion or $578.9 million. (EIU no. 3, p. 34)
When Burma's domestic political scene exploded in the summer of 
1988, all of these assistance plans were suddenly open to reconsideration.
By August 31 Burma's second largest aid source, West Germany, suspended 
its assistance program to protest Burmese human rights violations. (FEER, 
9/22/88 p. 15) Japan threatened to suspend aid if the human rights 
violations did not cease, or if the liberalization of the economy was not
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begun in August. (E ll! no. 4, pp. 27-28) In spite of these threats the Japanese 
did not actually formally suspend the aid program until October. At that 
time MFA issued a formal statement demanding'a peaceful democratic 
solution to Burma's domestic turmoil. (PEER, 10/13/88, p. 12) Because the 
military government which came to power in September changed the formal 
name of the country, protocol demands that it be formally recognized. (FEER 
11/17/88, p. 34) Throughout the early months of winter Japan held fast to 
their demands for democratic elections before they would begin their 
assistance program again. (FEER, 11/10/88, p. 13)
However, Japan reversed this position on February 17,1989 and recognized 
the new Burmese government, thus paving the way for resumption of the aid 
program. The general feeling in the Japanese government seemed to be that 
Japan would be in a better position to favorably influence the Burmese 
Government if they were providing aid, than if they were not. (New York 
Times, 2/18/89, p.4)
CONCLUSION
During the 1970s period of increased foreign assistance some of 
Burma's fears of "foreign domination" were substantiated to a degree by the 
appearance of a debt problem. In the first decade of military rule Burma
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borrowed an average of $28 million per year. This number increased rapidly 
after the policy changes of 1972 and by 1979 Burma borrowed $350 million. 
As a result in 1984 the debt service ratio (gross external liability/GNP [%]) 
was 36.3% (Taylor, p.347)
It seems rather clear that Japan has continued to provide economic 
assistance to Burma even after the reparations payments were ended in 
hopes of gaining access to Burma's potentially large markets and abundant 
natural resources. These resources are of a great variety. Mont of the 
remaining teak in the world is in Burma's forests which also contain other 
valuable hardwoods. Tin, oil and natural gas are the most important of the 
mineral resources; however Burma also has significant quantities of zinc, 
lead, tungsten, bayter, gypsum, jade, silver, copper, and coal. (EIU Country 
Profile, pp. 48-49) Burma could also appeal to Japan as a potential source 
for agricultural products. Even with all the potential, development has not 
happened. Because of this Japan has not been able to realize any of these 
expectations. Even so the aid continues to flow. In the literature on aid 
which looks at this relationship from the Japanese side, Burma usually 
receives only a passing mention. And the same is even more true for other 
major donor nations. The only other DAC member who has contributed 
substantial amounts of aid is West Germany.
Why should this relationship be considered as an example of Japanese 
foreign aid? Mainly because Burma has been one of the top 10 countries in 
terms of the percentage of Japanese aid received consistently throughout
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this relationship. Burma thus has to be an important recipient to have 
consistently remained one of the most favored.
MAJOR RECIPIENTS OF INDIVIDUAL DAC MEMBERS AID -  JAPAN
irsements
total oda
$ million
1970-71 1980-81 1983-84
Indonesia 22.9 Indonesia 11.2 China 8.2
Korea 19.8 Korea 7.0 Indonesia 7.1
India 10.2 Thailand 5.9 Thailand 5.9
Pakistan 7.9 Bangladesh 5.0 Malaysia 4.2
Philippines 4.4 Philippines 4.7 Philippines 4.0
Burma 3.5 Burma 4.1 India 2.8
Thailand 2.9 Pakistan 3.6 Bangladesh 2.6
Taiwan 2.5 Egypt 2.7 Burma 2.6
Iran 1.4 Malaysia 2.3 Pakistan 2.0
Sri Lanka 1.3 India 2.2 Egypt 1.8
Malaysia 1.3 Sri Lanka 1.4 Korea 1.7
Singapore 1.1 Zaire 1.3 Sri Lanka 1.6
Nigeria 1.1 Tanzania 1.1 Kenya 1.0
Kampuchea 0.9 Turkey 0.9 Mexico 0.9
Viet Nam 0.9 Nepal 0.8 Peru 0.8
Laos 0.9 Brazil 0.6 Turkey 0.8
Kenya 0.6 Brazil 0.7
Bolivia 0.7 Bolivia 02
total above 83.0 56.5 494
multilateral 14.9 31.6 35.7
unallocated _2*2_
3,592 4,526
source: OECD Report 1986, p.25
It seems plausible that the Japanese government has been inclined to 
provide this assistance when other DAC member nations have not because
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the Japanese aid program is focused on different precepts than the truly 
Western nations. Due to self-imposed isolation Burma has not fit into any 
nation's idea of an appropriate target for foreign aid as foreign policy. Nor 
has Burma been regarded as a nation that should receive aid for 
humanitarian reasons. Although Burma is a poor nation its people have not 
suffered as severely as those in countries like Bangladesh or the Sudan. 
Perhaps Britain would have continued aid to their ex-colony as a matter of 
principle if the Burmese would have permitted it in the 1960s, but it was 
not allowed.
The peculiarities of the Japanese aid system seem to have made it the 
only major donor country whose objectives make Burma a candidate for 
substantial amounts of economic assistance. The other donor countries are 
not so badly in need of raw materials that they would pin their hopes upon a 
nation that does not have the stability and organization necessary to access 
these resources. Those donor countries who move on the strategic level 
would have little interest in a country that has intentionally isolated itself 
from the international community. These same peculiarities made Japan an 
acceptable benefactor to the Burmese. Burma did not have to feel that they 
were accepting charity, or compromising their independence by accepting 
Japanese aid, for several reasons. First, they had the right to receive 
repayment for the damage suffered during the war. Accepting aid that was 
demanded and won is quite different from the West's offerings, which Burma 
saw as charity. Secondly, once the reparations were paid, the Burmese were
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quite dependent on the Japanese; both for the industrial and resource 
development projects, and also for the management expertise the Japanese 
exhibited in planning these projects. Some third world nations take offense 
at Japan's desire to plan and control all stages of a project. The Burmese 
appear happy to have someone else making the critical decisions. The 
Japanese seem to feel that they do have special access to the 
independent-minded Burmese as evidenced by their actions in the recent 
turmoil. Other donors threatened Burma, and withdrew their aid when the 
Burmese would not comply with their demands for reform. The Japanese 
felt that they could do the most good by keeping the lines of communication 
open; therefore they held out their aid projects for a very short time, even 
though they also had economic reasons to withhold aid.
The assistance relationship between these two nations has worked so 
well for very simple reasons. Each country is a bit of a renegade in the 
overall international aid community, each determined to use aid programs 
for their own independent interests. It worked out that many of the things 
each nation was looking for in an aid partner could be found in this 
relationship. Burma was given access to the industrial equipment and 
management it needed, without having to subjugate its independence to 
another nation's strategic interests. Japan did not enter the relationship 
willingly; however, it was able to get a foot In the door of one of the 
wealthiest nation's in terms of natural resources. Burma also served Japan 
as a market for the heavy industrial equipment it sold to make its
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phenomenal economic comeback.
It does not seem likely that the relationship between these two nations 
will weaken as Burma tries to solve its current rounds of chaos. Japan 
appears willing to keep communication going, and the latest Burmese 
government is in desperate need of powerful friends to help with its 
economic difficulties.
ORGANIZATIONS OF THE JAPANESE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) 
Ministry of Finance (MOF)
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF) 
Economic Planning Agency (EPA)
Export-Import Bank (Exim Bank)
Japan ■nternational Cooperation Agency (JICA)
Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers (JOCV) 
Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF)
Overseas Technical Cooperation Agency (OTCA)
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